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ESTABLISHING THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT, 1947
ELLISON D. SMITH, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
Title I of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, common-
ly known as the Taft-Hartley Act, like its predecessor, the Wagner
Act, has as its prime objective, the promotion of collective bargain-
ing. As a means to accomplishing this result, the Act creates certain
basic rights and obligations.
The Act guarantees to employees of employers engaged in inter-
state commerce "the right to self-organization, . . .to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing;"1 and imposes
upon employers the obligation to recognize this right by making it
an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collec-
tively2 with the representatives of his employees, subject to the pro-
visions of Section 9, (a)"; and imposes upon labor organizations the
duty to bargain collectively by making it an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization "to refuse to bargain collectively 3 with an
employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject
to the provisions of Section 9(a)." Section 9(a) provides: "Repre-
sentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the em-
ployees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining .... "
While the Act does not require that any particular procedure be
followed in the selection of the exclusive bargaining representative
so long as the representative is clearly the choice of the majority,
one method is through a secret ballot election conducted by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board. The Board processes are invoked
by the filing of a representation petition.4 Once a petition has been
tMember of the law firm of Smith and Bradley Columbia, S. C.; Special Assistant to
the General Counsel, N. L. B. B., 1947 to 1950 Associate General Counsel, N. L. B. B.,
1950 to 1953; former lecturer on Labor Law, National University School of Law, Wash-
ington, D. C.
1. § 7. All references to sections in this article are to the Labor Relations Act
of 1947.
2. § 8(a) (5).
3. § 8(b) (3).
4. §9(c) (1).
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filed, the Board5 has full statutory power to determine the exclusive
representative.
Petitions may be filed by a labor organization or other employee
representatives seeking exclusive representative status ;6 an employ-
er when faced with one or more claims for recognition ;7 by a labor
organization or other employee representative seeking exclusive re-
presentation; or by employees or their representatives seeking to oust
the currently recognized or certified bargaining agent.8
After the filing of the petition with the Regional Director in the
region where the proposed or actual bargaining unit exists, an in-
vestigation is conducted.9 This investigation seeks to determine inter
alia, (1) whether the employer's operations affect commerce within
the meaning of the Act; (2) the appropriateness of the unit; (3)
whether there exists a question concerning representation; (4) wheth-
er the election would effectuate the policies of the Act; (5) whether
the petitioner, if it be a labor organization seeking recognition, has
sufficient interest among the employees to warrant further proceed-
ings; or whether sufficient interest has been shown by a labor or-
ganization or person seeking decertification of an existing bargain-
ing relationship.1 0
Should as a result of the preliminary investigation it be determined
that the petition lacks merit because, among other reasons, the em-
ployer's operations do not affect commerce, or no question of repre-
sentation exists, or because of inappropriateness of unit, or improper
showing of interest, the Regional Director will ask that the petition
be withdrawn. Should the petitioner fail to withdraw the petition,
the Regional Director will dismiss the petition stating the reasons
for dismissal and also notify the petitioner of his right to appeal to
the Board in Washington. 11
The Board, upon receipt of appeal, reviews the file and either sus-
tains the Regional Director's dismissal or orders the Regional Di-
rector to take further action.
12
5. The Board is the quasi-judicial arm of the agency with exclusive jurisdic-
tion over representation matters. The General Counsel has exclusive jurisdic-
tion over unfair labor practice charges and complaints. § 3(d).
6. § 9()(1) a) (i).
7. § 9(c) (1) (b).
8. § 9(c) (1) (a) (I).
9. § 101.16, NATIONAL. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD STATEMENT OF PROCEDURE,
Series 6, as amended.
10. See § 101.17, NATIONAL LABOR RErATIONS BOARD STATEMENT OF PRO-
CEDURt, Series 6, as amended.
11. § 101.17(c), NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD STATEMXNT OF PRO-
CEDURE, Series 6, as amended.
12. See note 11 supra.
[Vol. 6
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CON SENT EIACTIONS' 8
In the event the preliminary investigation discloses that the pe-
tition has merit, the Regional Director will attempt to dispose of
the representation issues on an informal basis. These informal pro-
cedures are known as consent election agreements. Under the terms
of these agreements, the parties stipulate generally that there is a
question concerning representation; that the unit is appropriate; that
the eligibility to vote shall be determined by an agreed-upon pay
roll date; and they agree upon the date, place, and hours of balloting.
Consent election agreements are of two types: (a) those in which
the parties agree to be bound by the determinations of the Regional
Director regarding any election issues such as eligibility to vote,
challenges to ballots, and objections to the conduct of the election;
and, (b) those in which the parties agree that the Board shall deter-
mine election issues and certify. Should informal adjustment of the
question concerning representation be found impossible, the Regional
Director will issue a notice of formal hearing.
FORMAT, HEARING
14
These hearings are usually conducted by a field examiner or at-
torney attached to the regional office, are open to the public, and are
non-adversary in character. At the hearing, the parties are afford-
ed an opportunity to present their respective positions and to pro-
duce the significant facts in support of their contentions. In most
instances, a substantial number of uncontested items are stipulated.
Parties may examine and cross examine witnesses and at the con-
clusion of the hearing present oral argument. The hearing officer
at these hearings performs only a fact finding mission. He is pro-
hibited from making recommendations. 15 It is his duty to see that
a record is made which will enable the Board properly to decide the
case. At the conclusion of the hearing, the entire record is forward-
ed to Washington for review by the Board. After review of the
entire record, the Board renders a decision either dismissing the
petition or directing an election.
13. § 9(c) (4), and § 101.18, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD STATEMENT
OF PROcrDUER, Series 6, as amended.
14. § 9(c) (1) (b), and § 101.20, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD STATE-
MENT OF PRoCeURE, Series 6, as amended.
15. § 9(c) (1) (b) provides: "Such hearing may be conducted by an officer
or employee of the regional office who shall not make any recommendations
with respect thereto."
1954]
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Issums ARISING IN A REPRESENTATION CASE
Sections 9(f), (g) and (h):16
Unless a union has complied with the filing requirements of Sec-
tions 9(f), (g) and (h), the Board may not process any petition
filed by such union, certify it as the collective bargaining agent, or
investigate any question concerning representation. Therefore, the
Board will dismiss any petition filed by a non-complying union.
17
If a non-complying union seeks to intervene in a representation
proceeding, the Board will deny intervention unless the non-comply-
ing intervenor has a contractual interest covering employees affected
by the petition.' 8 Once granted the right to intervene, the non-com-
plying union will be heard on all questions raised by the petition even
to the extent of raising its contract as a bar to the election. However,
a non-complying intervenor will not be placed on the ballot in any
election.' 9
In a decertification proceeding a non-complying union is treated in
a different light. The Board will investigate the question concerning
representation, as it is the employees, not the non-complying labor
organization, who raise the question. In such case, the non-comply-
ing union will be placed on the ballot, for as the Board said in Harris
Foundry and Machine Co.:19a "To hold otherwise would confer
upon non-complying unions the power to immunize themselves against
decertification proceedings by their refusal to comply with the regis-
tration and filing requirements of the amended act." Should the non-
complying union win the decertification election, the Board will not
certify the union but only the arithmetical results of the election.
20
The Board will not place a non-complying union on the ballot in
an election initiated by an employer's petition.21 The Board reasoned
that although the employer filed the petition, the question concerning
representation was in fact raised by the non-complying union's claim
for recognition which was essential in order to invoke the Board's
processes on a petition filed by an employer.
In order to prevent circumvention of the filing requirements, the
Board will not allow non-complying locals to receive the benefits of
16. The sub-sections require, in general, the filing by labor organizations of
certain financial and other data with the Secretary of Labor, and refiling of
such material annually; furnishing their memberships with annual financial state-
ments; and filing with the Board non-communist affidavits by their officers.
17. Rite-Form Corset Co., Inc., 75 NLRB 174, 176 (1947).
18. Schneider Transportation Co., 75 NLRB 870 (1948).
19. New Indiana Chair Co., 80 NLRB 1686 (1948).
19a. 76 NLRB 118, 120 (1948).
20. See Harris Foundry and Machine Co., suPra note 19a., note 6.
21. Herman Lowenstein, Inc., 75 NLRB 377, 381 (1947).
[Vol. 6
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the Act by proceeding through their National or Internationals. The
Board in such cases will not put the National or International on
the ballot until the local achieves compliance.
22
SHOWING OF INTEREST
The Board has administratively determined that, in the absence
of special circumstances, the petitioner, in order to show a "substan-
tial" interest,2 3 must have been designated by at least 30 per cent of
the employees it seeks to represent.24 The Board adopted this rule
because experience had shown that it would result in a useless ex-
penditure of time and effort to conduct an election where there was
little likelihood that the petitioner would achieve its goal.2 5  How-
ever, the rule is different in regard to employer petitions, for the
Board has held that no proof of interest was required of the inter-
ested labor organizations.
2 6
Labor organizations seeking to intervene in representation proceed-
ings are required to show their interest. A 30 per cent interest is
not required unless the intervenor seeks a unit substantially different
from that of the petitioner.2 7 Adequate interest to intervene is usu-
ally found where the intervenor has a current or recent contractual28
or representative interest in the employees.29
EXISTENCE OF A QUESTION CONCERNING REPRESENTATION
Although there may be on file a proper petition, the Board must
determine that there exists a valid question concerning representa-
tion before it proceeds to an election and certification.
3 0
Ordinarily the Board has found that there is such a question if
the employer has refused a union's request for recognition as the
statutory agent, or in a decertification proceeding, the employees in
the unit challenge the representative status of a union which main-
tains that it is the statutory bargaining agent by virtue of a previous
certification or current recognition. 31
22. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 81 NLRB 295, 296 (1949).
23. The Board has consistently held that showing of interest is exclusively
an administrative matter and its determination of the question is not subject to
challenge. This position has been upheld. NLRB v. J. I. Case Co., 201 F. 2d
597, Enfg. 95 NLRB 1493 (1951).
24. § 9(c) (1) (a) provides that a petition be supported by a "substantial num-
ber of employees".
25. E. g., Consolidated Steamship Co., 75 NLRB 1254 (1948).
26. 0. E. Felton, d/b/a Felton Oil Co., 78 NLRB 1033 (1948).
27. E. g., Boeing Airplane Co., 86 NLRB 368, 369 (1949).
28. E. g., Holland Furnace Co., 95 NLRB 1339, 1340 (1951). Note 2.
29. E. g., Cadillac Motor Car Division, 94 NLRB 217, 218 (1951).
30. § 9(c) (1) (b) states ". . . if it [the Board] has reasonable cause to be-
lieve that a question of representation affecting commerce exists . . ."
31. Thirteenth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, 26.
1954]
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The Board has, however, found a question concerning represen-
tation where the petition was filed by a union which was admittedly
recognized by the employer. 32  The purpose of the petition was to
obtain the benefits that flowed from formal certification by the
Board.33 The Board directed an election stating inter alia: "In this
case, we are of the opinion that there is such a question, created by
the petitioners' assertion of majority standing, its expressed desire
to secure a certificate, and its formal petition that the Board investi-
gate its status by the statutory method of conducting an election."
However, the Board will not find a question concerning represen-
tation where the petitioning union has been certified by the Board
and is currently recognized.
3 4
Under circumstances where a petitioning union, or a union claim-
ing to represent employees of an employer who has filed a petition,
or an incumbent union faced with a decertification petition, requests
permission to withdraw or disclaims any further interest in the em-
ployees as the case may be, the Board has generally dismissed the
petition without prejudice.
However, the Board has recently decided three cases in which a
new rule on withdrawals and disclaimers is laid down. From now on
the dismissal will be with prejudice to the filing of a petition by the
withdrawing or disclaiming union for a period of six months, absent
good cause shown to the contrary. Also the Board stated it would
entertain a motion by the employer, petitioner, or the person filing
a decertification petition, to reinstate such petitions should the union
involved make a claim upon the employer within six months of the
dismissal order.35
THr APPROPRIATE UNIT
The Act requires the Board to determine what unit of employees
is the appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargainingS6
This is an important function, for the exclusive representative status
spoken of in Section 9(a) is conditioned upon the unit being appro-
priate. Therefore, in any unfair labor practice proceeding charg-
ing a refusal to bargain, one of the elements which must be estab-
32. General Box Co., 82 NLRB 678 (1949).
33. See § 8(b) (4) (b), (c), and (d), and discussion in General Box Co.,
supra note 32.
34. Botany Mills, Inc., 101 NLRB 293 (1952).
35. Sears Roebuck and Co., 107 NLRB No. 162 (1954); Campos Dairy Pro-
ducts, 107 NLRB No. 163 (1954) ; Little Rock Road Machinery Co., 107 NLRB
No. 164 (1954).
36. § 9(b) provides: "The Board shall decide in each case whether...
the Unit appropriate . shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or
subdivision thereof:...
[Vol. 6
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lished is that the unit is appropriate. Otherwise there is no refusal
to bargain.
In determining unit the Board has rather broad discretion, ex-
cept where such discretion has been limited by the statute itself.
37
Throughout the years, the Board has developed some rather well-
defined formulas in determining the appropriate unit. These formu-
las, however well-defined, are, of course, subject to deviation as the
need arises in a particular case. In deciding the appropriate unit,
the Board is usually confronted with one or more of the following
issues. (1) type, (2) scope, and (3) composition.
In relation to the type of unit, the Board considers whether it
should find a general overall unit, embracing, for example, all em-
ployees, such as a production and maintenance unit, or find a craft
unit confined to a small specialized group within the class of pro-
duction and maintenance employees. Scope of unit requires con-
sideration of whether all employees should be embraced in a given
class at only one plant or establishment of one employer, or at several
plants of the same employer, or, at all or several plants of a group
or an association of employers. Composition requires consideration
of whether to include in the unit certain employee groups not clearly
within the occupational group which will make up the unit as a whole.
In such fringe groups are found clerks, inspectors, technical employ-
ees, and many others.
In its determination of the appropriate unit, the Board has de-
veloped certain criteria. Chief among these are: (1) Mutuality of
interest; (2) History of collective bargaining; (3) Extent of or-
ganization; (4) Nature of employer's operations; and (5) Desires of
employees concerned.
The extent to which the Board considers mutuality of interest
as a controlling element in deciding the unit issue is stated in Conti-
nental Baking Co. where it said: "First and foremost is the principle
that mutuality of interest in wages, hours, and working conditions is
the prime determinant of whether a given group of employees consti-
tute an appropriate unit."s 7a
The Board places great emphasis on the history of collective bar-
gaining in arriving at a unit finding. Where collective bargaining
relationships have been harmonious, resulting in stability, the Board
is loathe to upset such relationships. The Board in Baltinore Transit
Company stated: "As a matter of policy, the Board is ordinarily
37. See proviso to § 9(b).
37a. 99 NLRB 777, 782 (1952).
1954]
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reluctant to disturb a prior unit determination or a contract unit
established as a result of collective bargaining, in the absence of
compelling circumstances.
'3 7 b
However, history of collective bargaining to be given controlling
weight in unit determinations must be of substantial duration. Thus,
the Board refused to find a collective bargaining history of only two
months controlling.3 8 Nor will the Board find collective bargaining
history controlling where the bargaining has been for union members
only.3 9 Moreover, the Board will not base a unit finding on bar-
gaining history where there is no written agreement containing a
fixed term or substantive provisions ;40 or where the union, party to
the relationship, has been found to be company dominated ;41 or where
the bargaining history conflicts with well-established Board policy.42
While the Act 43 precludes the extent to which employees have been
organized as controlling in unit determinations, the Board still con-
siders extent of organization as a factor.
44
In considering the nature of the employer's operation, the Board
is usually faced with a situation where the employer operates more
than one plant or establishment. In such situations, the Board takes
into consideration the following factors: (1) past bargaining prac-
tices of the employer; (2) the extent of interchange of employees
between plants or sections of the company, and contacts between the
various groups of employees; (3) the extent of functional integra-
tion of operations between the plants or sections; (4) differences in
the products of the plant or in the skills and types of work required;
(5) the centralization, or lack of centralization, of management and
supervision, particularly in regard to labor relations and the power
to hire and discharge; and (6) the physical or geographical location
of the plants in relation to each other.
45
The desires of employees are considered only when the Board is
faced with claims for representation by two or more unions each
seeking different but equally appropriate units. In this situation,
the Board will conduct a self-determination election among the em-
ployees involved. This type of election is commonly called a "Globe"
37b. 92 NLRB 688, 693 (1950).
38. Sprague Electric Co., 98 NLRB 533, 535 note 8 (1952).
39. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 98 NLRB 1300, 1302 (1952).
40. Corn Products Refining Co., 52 NLRB 1324 (1943).
41. Albert's Inc., 91 NLRB 522, 524 (1950), and cases cited therein.
42. Bethlehem Pacific Coast Steel Corp., 99 NLRB 115, 116 ftn. 3 (1952).
43. § 9(c) (5) provides that: "In determining whether a unit is appropriate
the extent to which the employees have been organized shall not be controlling."
44. Thalhimer Brothers, Inc., 81 NLRB 1175, 1176 (1949).
45. For details see SIXTZENTE " ANNUAL REPORT OF TH4 NATIONAL LABOR
RIrLATIONS BoAnD 98.
[Vol. 6
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election, the name being taken from the Globe Machine case, 45 a where
the self determination rule was first established. Such elections are
most commonly held in situations where one union is seeking an
overall unit embracing the production and maintenance employees, that
includes a group of craft employees sought to be represented by an-
other union in a craft unit.46
To describe a self determination election, let us assume that union
S seeks to represent the smaller or craft unit, and union L seeks to
represent the larger unit including the smaller unit. The smaller
unit is voted separately with union S, union L and "no union" on
the ballot. The remaining employees sought to be represented by
union L are then voted with only it on the ballot in a "Yes" or "No"
vote. If a majority of the employees in the smaller group vote for
union S that indicates a desire for separate representation and union
S is certified as their bargaining representative. But if group S
votes for union L and union L wins in the larger group, union L is
then certified. However, if union L loses in the larger group but
wins in the smaller and a pooling of the votes indicates that union L
has received a majority of the valid votes cast in both elections, it is
then certified for a majority of the employees have indicated a desire
for it as their collective bargaining agent.47
In making unit determinations concerning professional employees,
craft employees, and guards, the Board must consider Sections 9(b)
(1), (2) and (3). Section 9(b) (1) prohibits the Board including
professional employees in a unit with non-professionals unless the
professional employees vote for such an inclusion. The Board has
devised election machinery to accomplish this purpose.
48
Section 9(b) (2) in effect tells the Board to conduct "Globe" type
elections for craft employees without regard to prior unit determina-
tions. The Board in a very recent decision has decided to grant
craft severance elections only in those instances where there exists
a true craft and where the union seeking to represent it traditionally
represents that craft.49 This decision marks a departure from pre-
vious decisions of the Board where craft severance elections were
denied on the "integrations of operations" theory.5 °
45a. 3 NLRB 294 (1937).
46. Supra note 45 at p. 92.
47. American Potash and Chemical Corp., 107 NLRB No. 290 (1954). See
also the dissenting opinion in Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 105 NLRB
No. 54 (1953).
48. Sonotone Corporation, 90 NLRB 1236 (1950).
49. American Potash and Chemical Corp., supra note 47.
50. National Tube Company, 76 NLRB 1199 (1948) : Permanente Metals Co.,
89 NLRB 804 (1950); Weyerhauser Timber Co., 87 NLRB 1076 (1949).
1954]
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Section 9(b) (3) precludes the Board from including guards in
the same unit with other employees and from certifying a union as
the bargaining agent for guards if that union or any other union
with which it is affiliated admits to membership employees other than
guards.
CONTRAcT BAR
In cases where it had to decide whether to hold an election where
a contract was in existence covering the same group of employees
sought by the petitioner, the Board has been called upon to weigh
two major considerations, both under the aegis of announced policies
of the Act. These are (1) the interest of the parties and of the public
in stability of labor-management relations, and (2) the statutory
right of employees to select and change their collective bargaining
representative.51
With these considerations in mind, the Board has evolved the
general rule that a valid written exclusive bargaining agreement for
a definite and reasonable period, signed by the parties embodying
substantive terms and conditions of employment for employees in an
appropriate unit, bars a petition for an election among the employees
covered by the contract until shortly before the contract's terminal
date.
Thus, applying this general rule, the Board has held that an oral
agreement,52 an unsigned written one,5 3 one failing to establish sub-
stantive terms and conditions of employment,5 4 one covering only
members of the contracting union,55 one excluding the employees in
the unit sought by the petitioner,5 6 one placing the employees in-
volved in a unit inappropriate for collective bargaining purposes,
5 7
one for an indefinite duration or terminable at will,58 or one con-
51. See FIFTIENTH ANNUAL REPORT Ov THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD 60.
52. Eicor, Inc., 46 NLRB 1035, 1037 (1943); Standard Brands, Inc., 81
NLRB 1311, 1312 (1949); American Can Co., 89 NLRB 1220, 1221 (1950).
53. National Chair Co., Inc., 74 NLRB 1014, 1018 (1947) ; Solar Mfg. Corp.,
80 NLRB 1358 (1948) note 1.
54. Corn Products Refining Co., vtpra note 40; Rice-Stix Dry Goods Co.,
78 NLRB 311, 312 (1948) note 4.
55. Birmingham Tank Co., 25 NLRB 1306, 1308 (1940); Liggett and Myers
Tobacco Co., 98 NLRB 1300, 1301 (1952).
56. Philadelphia Co. and Associated Co's., 84 NLRB 115, 116 (1949) ; W. H.
Anderson Co., Inc., 99 NLRB 820 (1952).
57. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 90 NLRB 685, 686 (1950), and case cited
therein.
58. Food Machinery Corp., 67 NLRB 1049, 1051 (1946); Mid-Continent Coal
Corp., 82 NLRB 261, 262 (1949).
[ ol. 6
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taining an illegal union-security clause,5 9 will not operate to bar an
election.
From these decisions, it can readily be seen that with contracts
which do not meet the requirements of the general rule little or no
problem is presented to the holding of an election. But what of those
contracts which do meet the requirements of the rule but neverthe-
less present a problem affecting the two principles of stability and
employee rights? Such contracts would be those providing for auto-
matic renewal unless notice to the contrary is given at a stated time
and no such notice is given; those reopened for modification during
their term; those for a duration of more than two years; those in
effect when a change in the bargaining unit has taken place; those
in effect when there is a split-up within a union's ranks; and those
prematurely extended.
The landmark decision of the Board in situations involving an
automatic renewal clause contract where no notice of modification or
termination was given was the decision in 1942 in the Mill B. case.
59a
Prior to this decision, the general rule had been that on a claim to
majority representation made before the expiration date of the con-
tract but after the automatic renewal date-no notice to forestall
renewal having been given-the contract was not a bar.60 But,
the Mill B. decision effected a change in this rule, holding that the
contract was a bar if it had been renewed by operation of its automatic
renewal clause even though a claim for representation was made be-
fore the contract's original expiration date.
6 1
Thus, the Board required that a claim for representation to be
timely and to operate to prevent a contract from being a bar to an
election must antedate not only the execution date of an agreement
but the automatic renewal date as well, in those cases where the
contract contained such a clause and it had not been rendered in-
operative by notice.
But it soon became apparent that this "timely claim" rule was
subject to abuse where a union made a mere naked claim of majority
representation but did not substantiate the claim with a petition with-
59. C. Hager Hinge and Sons Hinge Mfg. Co., 80 NLRB 163 (1948); Eagle
Lock Co., 88 NLRB 970 (1950).
59a. 40 NLRB 346 (1942).
60. E. g., a one year contract executed on March 15, 1950 contains an auto-
matic renewal clause absent 30 days notice. No notice is given. A claim for
representation is made on March 10, 1951. The contract is not a bar since
the claim was made prior to its expiration date of March 15, 1951, though after
the automatic renewal date.
61. R. g., Assume same facts as in note 60. The contract would be a bar
even though the claim was prior to its expiration date since it was after the
automatic renewal clause date had passed and the contract was thus renewed.
1954]
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in a reasonable time. Thus any contract executed after such a claim
was made pursuant to the Mill B. doctrine would not bar an election.
To meet these abuses the Board in the General Electric X-ray
Corporation case 61 a established the doctrine that the mere naked as-
sertion of majority claimed must be followed within 10 days by a
representation petition filed with the Board or the contract executed
subsequent to the claim will be a bar to an election. The Board
reasoned that by compelling the claimant to file a formal petition, it
soon could be determined if its claim to representation was well
founded. Thus if its interest was less than 30 per cent, the peti-
tion would be dismissed and the existing contract would be undis-
turbed. Of course, if the claimant's interest is substantial, the con-
tract executed within the 10 days between the claim and the petition
would be no bar and an election would be held.
The General Electric X-ray 10-day rule does not apply, however,
where the claim for representation was substantial and had a recog-
nizable foundation.
6 2
In respect to contracts which are reopened by the parties during
the contract's term, the Board will hold the contract a bar to an
election on a petition for representation filed at the time of the re-
opening negotiations. This is so whether or not the contract contains
a reopening clause and regardless of the scope of the modifications. 63
This ruling extended the Board's former practice of holding a con-
tract to be no bar to an otherwise prematurely filed petition for repre-
sentation if the contract was "opened up" in the absence of a reopen-
ing clause or if the modifications went beyond the scope of such a
clause where one existed.
The contract bar question also becomes important in relation to
the duration of a contract. For some considerable time, the Board
held contracts of one year's duration reasonable and thus a bar to
an election. 64 This rule was not absolute in that the contract for a
longer period than one year would be a bar if such contracts were
customary in the particular industry.65
More recently however, in the interests of industrial relations sta-
bility, the Board adopted the tvo year term as reasonable, even where
industry custom was to the contrary.66 Unless longer term contracts
61a. 67 NLRB 997 (1946).
62. Acme Brewing Co., 72 NLRB 1005 (1947); McLeod Veneer Co., 73
NLRB 859 (1947) ; Chicago Bridge and Iron Co., 88 NLRB 402 (1950).
63. Western Electric Co., Inc., 94 NLRB 54 (1951).
64. National Sugar Refining Co. of N. J., 10 NLRB 1410 (1939).
65. Owens-Illinois Pacific Coast Co., 36 NLRB 990, 995 (1941); cf. Uxbridge
Worsted Co., Inc., 60 NLRB 1395 (1945).
66. Reed Roller Bit Co., 72 NLRB 927 (1947).
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are customary in the particular industry, the Board will hold them
a bar for two years only.
6 7
In the past year the "custom in the industry" test has been changed
by the Board. Now, contracts of more than two years duration
will operate as a bar for their entire term rather than just the first
two years, if they meet the test that "a substantial part of the in-
dustry is covered by contracts with a similar term".68 Thus, in the
cited case, a five year agreement was found to be a bar. The question
of whether an agreement for more than five years will operate as a
bar under any circumstances after two years of its term has elapsed
was left open.
A change in the bargaining unit often raises the question as to
whether an existing contract is a bar to an election. These questions
arise most frequently in a newly established plant or among employ-
ees on a new operation.
Generally, the Board will not hold a contract covering a discon-
tinued plant as barring an election at a new plant.69 Distance, per-
sonnel, and similarity of production are factors to be considered in
this situation. Thus a contract will bar an election where a new
plant, which is located only a short distance from the closed one,
employs a majority of the old plant's employees, and the product of
the new plant is substantially the same as the old.
70
The "schism" situation is another in which the status of an exist-
ing contract as a bar to an election is presented. A schism arises
usually where all or a large part of the employees under a contract
repudiate the union representing them by some act of disaffiliation
and selection of another union to represent them. Generally, under
such circumstances, the Board would hold a contract no bar where
substantial doubt as to the bargaining agent was raised by schism.
7 1
A last but important contract bar situation to be considered is
that of a prematurely extended contract. A contract whose termina-
tion date is extended a considerable time prior to its original termina-
tion date is deemed to have been prematurely extended. As a
general rule, the Board will not hold such an extended contract a
bar to an election beyond its original terminal date where a petition
for representation was timely filed before the expiration date of the
67. Cushman's Sons, Inc., 88 NLRB 121, 124 (1950).
68. General Motors Corp., 102 NLRB 1140 (1953).
69. Sylvania Electric Products Co., 87 NLRB 597 (1949).
70. Yale Rubber Mfg. Co., 85 NLRB 131, 133 (1949), and cases cited therein.
71. Boston Machine Works Co., 89 NLRB 59, 60 (1950), and cases cited
therein.
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original contract 72 The same rule applies to a contract with an auto-
matic renewal clause except the date of operation of such clause,
rather than the contract's expiration date, is applicable.
The 60-day notice requirement of Section 8(d) 73 of the Act, ap-
plicable where a modification or termination of an agreement is desired
by either party thereto, has required the Board to determine its
effect on the "premature extension" doctrine.
In the DeSoto Creamery case, 7aa the Board was presented with a
situation which was in effect as follows. A one year contract had
a 30 day renewal clause but 60 days before the contract's expiration
date, written notice by the union was served of a desire to modify.
(The 60-day notice is required by Section 8(d), not by the con-
tract.) And 45 days before the contract's expiration date a new
agreement was executed. In this posture, a petition was filed by an-
other union a few days after the execution of the contract. The Board
stated the contract would be a bar absent circumstances not here
pertinent. In the decision it clearly enunciated a rule to be appli-
cable in the future that, even though a petition was timely under
the contract's 30-day renewal clause, the purpose of Section 8(d)
was patently designed for negotiation and execution of new contracts
during the 60-day period, and, therefore, such contracts would bar
elections. The Board, at the same time, made it clear that had a
75-day notice been served and a contract executed within 15 days
thereafter, the "premature extension" doctrine would have applied
and an election directed on the basis of a timely filed petition.
THr. ELcoN
Once the necessary elements of a question concerning representa-
tion have been decided, the Board must conduct an election to final-
ly determine whether the particular employees involved desire a bar-
gaining agent.
In general, the conduct of the election, the eligibility of employees
to vote, and the certification of the election results are left to the
Board's discretion. However, the Act does require that the election
be by secret ballot,7 4 and prohibits the holding of an election in a
bargaining unit where, in the preceeding twelve months, a valid elec-
72. American Steel Foundries, 85 NLRB 19, 20 (1949), and cases cited
therein.
73, § 8(d)(1) requires either party to an agreement to give 60 days notice
prior to the expiration date of the agreement of an intention to terminate ormodify.
73a. 94 NLRB 1627 (1951).
74. § 9(c) (1) (b).
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tion shall have been held. 75 Also, voting by employees who are not
entitled to reinstatement is prohibited.
76
The question of which employees are eligible to vote is an im-
portant one to all partjes concerned in an election. Who is and who
is not an employee within the definition of that term in the Act
77
is a question for the Board to decide. In general, though, individuals
employed in the appropriate unit during the payroll period immediate-
ly preceding the date of the direction of election, including those not
working during such period because of illness, or being on vacation,
or being temporarily laid-off, are eligible to vote. Those who have
quit, been discharged for cause, or are on strike and not entitled to
reinstatement, are not eligible to vote.
The determination of this important question is not an easy one,
and, while prior Board decisions are helpful, the matter of eligibility
usually stands or falls on the facts peculiar to each case. As diffi-
cult as any, is the problem involving strikes, since it is not always a
simple matter to accurately determine which strikers have been valid-
ly replaced (the economic strikers only may be replaced) and which
are entitled to reinstatement. In those cases where such is not easily
determinable the Board will presume both strikers and replacements
are eligible to vote and will permit them to vote subject to challenge.
78
The accurate determination of eligibility will then be made if the
challenged ballots be sufficient to affect the election result.
In any Board election all parties concerned may have an observer
on the scene and may challenge ballots and object to the conduct of
an election. Once objections have been made, the investigation will
not be confined to those specifically made. Thus any defect or irregu-
larity found in the investigation will void the election if it be sub-
stantial.
In the event the election results are inconclusive, i. e., where two
or more unions and a no union choice is on the ballot and neither
obtains a majority of the valid votes cast, the Board will conduct
a run-off election. The Act specifically provides that the ballot in
this run-off election shall afford the employees a selection between
the two choices receiving the largest and second largest number of
valid votes cast in the original election.
79
75. § 9(c) (3).
76. See note 75 supra.
77. § 2(3) defines "employee" and excludes among others agricultural work-
ers and supervisors.
78. The Pipe Machinery Co., 76 NLRB 247, 249 (1948).
79. See note 75 supra.
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JUDICIAL REVIw O REPRESENTATION CASES
The Supreme Court has held that a certification of representation
issued by the Board pursuant to Section 9(c) is not directly review-
able by the Courts.80 However, the Courts are required to review
facts certified by the Board in a representation case where the Board
in an unfair labor practice case has based its order in whole or in part
upon such facts.8 1 Usually this review occurs in proceedings before
the Court arising from an unfair labor practice finding by the Board
of a refusal to bargain.
80. A. F. L. v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
81. § 9(d).
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